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Abstract
A connection between the theory of neural networks and cryptog-
raphy is presented. A new phenomenon, namely synchronization of
neural networks is leading to a new method of exchange of secret mes-
sages. Numerical simulations show that two artificial networks being
trained by Hebbian learning rule on their mutual outputs develop an
antiparallel state of their synaptic weights. The synchronized weights
are used to construct an ephemeral key exchange protocol for a secure
transmission of secret data. It is shown that an opponent who knows
the protocol and all details of any transmission of the data has no
chance to decrypt the secret message, since tracking the weights is a
hard problem compared to synchronization. The complexity of the
generation of the secure channel is linear with the size of the network.
PACS numbers: 87.18.Sn,89.70.+c
The ability to build a secure channel is one of the most challenging fields
of research in modern communication. Since the secure channel has many
applications, in particular for mobile phone, satellite and internet-based com-
munications, there is a need for fast, effective and secure transmission proto-
cols [1]. Here we present a novel principle of a cryptosystem based on a new
phenomenon which we observe for artificial neural networks.
The goal of cryptography is to enable two partners to communicate over
an insecure channel in such a way that an opponent cannot understand and
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decrypt the transmitted message. In a general scenario, the message is en-
crypted by the sender through a key Ek and the result, the ciphertext, is
sent over the channel. A third party, eavesdropping on the channel, should
not determine what the message was. However, the recipient who knows the
encryption key can decrypt the ciphertext using his private key Dk.
In a private–key system the recipient has to agree with the sender on a
secret key Ek, which requires a hidden communication prior to the transmis-
sion of any message. In a public–key system, on the other side, the key Ek
is published and a hidden communication is not necessary. Nevertheless, an
opponent cannot decrypt the transmitted message since it is computationally
infeasible to invert the encryption function without knowing the key Dk. In
a key-exchange protocol, both partner start with private keys and transmit
– using a public protocol – their encrypted private keys which, after some
transformations, leads to a common secret key. In most applications a public-
key system is used which is based on number theory where the keys are long
integers [1, 2].
In this report we suggest a novel cryptosystem. It is a key-exchange
protocol which does neither use number theory nor a public key, but it is
based on a learning process of neural networks: The two participants start
from a secret set of vectors Ek(0) and Dk(0) without knowing the key of their
partner. By exchanging public information the two keys develop to a common
time dependent key Ek(t) = −Dk(t), which is used to encrypt and decrypt
a given message. An opponent who knows the algorithm and observes any
exchange of information is not able to find the keys Ek(t) and Dk(t). Our
method is based on a new phenomenon presented here: Synchronization of
neural networks by mutual learning [3].
Simple models of neural networks describe a wide variety of phenomena
in neurobiology and information theory [4, 5, 6]. Artificial neural networks
are systems of elements interacting by adaptive couplings which are trained
from a set of examples. After training they function as content addressable
associative memory, as classifiers or as prediction algorithms.
In this report we present a new phenomenon: Two feedforward networks
can synchronize their synaptic weights by exchanging and learning their mu-
tual outputs for given common inputs. Surprisingly, synchronization is fast;
the number of bits required to achieve perfect alignment of the weights is
lower than the number of components of the weights. After synchroniza-
tion, the synaptic weights define the common time dependent private key
Ek(t) = −Dk(t). With respect to possible applications we find that first,
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tracking the weights of one of the networks by the opponent is a hard prob-
lem. Although we were not able to find a mathematical proof, our simula-
tions, in addition to arguments based on analytic results on neural networks,
give clear evidence that our key exchange protocol is secure [18]. Second, the
complexity of our cryptosystems scales linearly with the size of the network
(=number of bits of the keys). In summary, from this new biological mecha-
nism one can construct efficient encryption systems using keys which change
permanently.
This phenomenon, as well as the corresponding applications in crypto-
graphy, can be extended to a system of several partners communicating with
each other, as well as to other tasks relying on a secure channel [18]. Since
synchronization is a subject of recent research in neuroscience too [7, 8, 9],
we believe that our bridge between the theory of neural networks and cryp-
tography may help to understand communication between parts of biological
neuronal or genetic networks.
In the following we introduce and investigate a simple model which shows
the properties sketched above. The architecture used by the recipient and
the sender is a two-layered perceptron, exemplified here by a parity machine
(PM) with K hidden units. More precisely, the size of the input is KN and
its components are denoted by xkj, k = 1, 2, ..., K and j = 1, ..., N .
For simplicity, each input unit takes binary values, xkj = ±1. The K binary
hidden units are denoted by y1, y2, ..., yK . Our architecture is characterized
by non-overlapping receptive fields (a tree), where the weight from the jth
input unit to the kth hidden unit is denoted by wkj, and the output bit O is
the product of the state of the hidden units (see Fig. 1). For simplicity we
discuss PMs with three hidden units K = 3. We use integer weights bounded
by L, i.e. wkj can take the values −L, − L+ 1, ..., L.
The secrete information of each of the two partners are the initial values
for the weights, wSkj and w
R
kj, for the sender and the recipient, respectively.
It consists of 6N integer numbers, 3N of the recipient and 3N of the sender.
Sender and recipient do not know the initial numbers of their partners, which
are used to construct the common secret key.
Now each network is trained with the output of its partner. At each
training step, for the synchronization as well as for the encryption/decryption
step, a new common public input vector (xkj) is needed for both the sender
and the recipient. For a given input, the output is calculated in the following
two steps. In the first one, the state of the three hidden units, y
S/R
k , k =
1, 2, 3, of the sender and the recipient are determined from the corresponding
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Figure 1: Architecture of the networks: 3N input units x are transmitted by
three weight vectors w to three hidden units y. The final output bit O is the
product of the hidden units.
fields
y
S/R
k = sign[
N∑
j=1
w
S/R
kj xkj ] (1)
In the case of zero field,
∑
w
S/R
kj xkj = 0, the sender/recipient sets the hidden
unit to 1/−1. In the next step the output OS/R is determined by the product
of the hidden units, OS/R = y
S/R
1 y
S/R
2 y
S/R
3 .
The sender is sending its output (one bit) to the recipient, the recipient
is sending its output to the sender and both networks are trained with the
output of its partner. In case that they do not agree on the current output,
OSOR < 0, the weights of the sender/recipient are updated according to the
following Hebbian learning rule [6, 10].
if
(
OS/Ry
S/R
k > 0
)
then w
S/R
kj = w
S/R
kj − O
S/R xkj
if
(
|w
S/R
kj | > L
)
then w
S/R
kj = sign(w
S/R
kj ) L (2)
Only weights belonging to the one (or three) hidden units which are in
the same state as that of their output unit are updated, in each one of the
two networks. Note that by using this dynamical rule, the sender is trying
to imitate the response of the recipient and the recipient is trying to imitate
the one of the sender.
There are three main ingredients in our model which are essential for a
secure key exchange protocol: First, from the knowledge of the output, the in-
ternal representation of the hidden units is not uniquely determined because
there is a four fold degeneracy (for the output +1 there are four internal repre-
sentations for the three hidden units (1, 1, 1), (1,−1,−1), (−1, 1,−1), (−1,−1, 1)).
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As a consequence, an observer cannot know which of the weight vectors is
updated according to equation (2). Second, we have chosen the parity ma-
chine since in the case of static weights, it is known that an opponent cannot
obtain any knowledge about the rule if he is trained with less than α(L)N
random examples (where α(L) = 2.63 for L = 3 and for more details see [11]).
This analytic result favours the PM over other multilayer networks. Third,
since each component is bounded by L, an observer cannot invert the sum
of equation (2); the network forgets [12]. As a consequence of these three in-
gredients, the initial weight vectors cannot be recovered from the knowledge
of the time dependent synchronized keys. All three of these mechanisms –
hidden units, PM as well as bounded weights – make the problem hard for
any observer.
We find that the two PMs learning from each other are able to synchro-
nize, at least for some parameters K,L and N [13]. Our simulations show
that after an initial relatively short transient time the two partners align
themselves into antiparallel states. It is easy to verify from our learning rule
that as soon as the two networks are synchronized they stay so forever. The
number of time steps to reach this state depends on the initial weight vectors
and on the sequence of random inputs, hence it is distributed. Fig. 2 shows
the distribution of synchronization time obtained from at least 1000 samples.
It is evident that two communicating networks synchronize in a rather short
time. The average synchronization time tav decreases with increasing size N
of the system, see Fig. 3; it seems to converge to tav ≃ 410 for infinitely large
networks. Surprisingly, in the limit of large N one needs to exchange only
about 400 bits to obtain agreement between 3N components. However, one
should keep in mind that the two partners do not learn the initial weights of
each other, they just are attracted to a dynamical state with opposite weight
vectors.
As soon as the weights of the sender and the recipient are antiparallel the
public initialization of our private-key cryptosystem is terminated success-
fully and the encryption of the message starts. Now there are two possibilities
to choose an algorithm: First, use a conventional encryption algorithm, for
example a stream cipher like the well-known Blum-Blum-Shub bit generator
[1]. In this case the seed for this pseudo-random number generator is con-
structed from our weight vector after synchronization. Second, use the PM
itself for a stream cipher by multiplying its output bit with the corresponding
bit of the secret data.
In the case of the PM, the complexity of the encryption/decryption pro-
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Figure 2: Distribution of synchronization time tsync for three sizes N of the
two networks.
cesses scales linearly with the size of the transmitted message, whereas the
complexity of the synchronization process does not scale with the size of the
network. Hence our construction is a linear cryptosystem [14].
Now we examine a possible attack on our cryptosystem. The opponent
eavesdropping on the line knows the algorithm as well as the actual mutual
outputs, hence he knows in which time steps the weights are changed. In
addition, the opponent knows the input xkj as well. However, the opponent
does not know the initial conditions of the weights of the sender and the
recipient. As a consequence, even for the synchronized state, the internal
representations of the hidden units of the sender and the recipient are hidden
from the opponent and he does not know which are the weights participating
in the learning step. For random inputs all four internal representations
appear with equal probability in any stage of the dynamical process, hence
for t training steps there are 4t possibilities to select internal representations.
Therefore, on the time scale of synchronization the observing network
has no chance to obtain complete knowledge about the other two networks.
We have simulated attacks of an observer, assuming that the most effective
algorithm is a network which has identical architecture to the recipient: A
PM with the same learning rule and parameters as described above. The
observing network is trained with the input vector and output bit of the
sender, and the training step (2) is performed only if sender and recipient
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Figure 3: Average synchronization time as a function of 1/N , for system size
N = 11, 21, 51, 101, 1001.
disagree with each other. Note that the sender does not react to the output
of the opponent, which results in a large noise to signal ratio compared with
the recipient [18].
The learning rule (2) may be considered for each component of the weight
vectors as a kind of biased random walk with reflecting boundaries. There-
fore, for very long times, the observer may take the weight vector of the other
network by chance. The distribution of the ratio between the time tsync the
sender and recipient need to synchronize and the learning time tlearn the
opponent needs for complete overlap is shown in Fig. 4. For N = 101 the
average learning time is a factor of about 125 larger than the corresponding
synchronization time. In addition, with increasing system size the tail of the
distribution for larger ratios is reduced.
Hence the time to synchronize by chance is very long and in the example
discussed here it is of order O(105) [16]. The heart of our cryptosystem is
that synchronization is a much simpler task than tracking by an observer.
This principle is also supported by the following observation. Assume
that the observer has already some knowledge about one of the networks,
he knows M out of N components for each of the three hidden units. We
have measured whether the observer succeeds to synchronize within 2000
time steps – a time much longer than the average synchronization time for
the two communicating networks. For M = N the observer is parallel to
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Figure 4: Frequency of the ratio r between synchronization and learning
times.
one of the networks and remains so forever. But already for M = N − 1
we find a high probability that the weight vector of the observer separates
completely from its almost parallel alignment. For smaller values of M this
probability decreases fast to zero. Surprisingly, even in case the observer has
almost complete knowledge about the two partners, he does not succeed to
achieve complete information from learning examples. This fact reduces the
probability of the opponent to imitate one of the communicating networks
using an ensemble of PMs.
Our key exchange protocol can be generalized to include Bit-Packages
as is briefly described below. An important issue for the implementation of
our cryptosystem is to accelerate the synchronization process from hundreds
of time steps to a few dozens while keeping the security of our channel.
Surprisingly, both of these two goals can be achieved simultaneously sending
bit packages (BP). In this scenario the process contains the following steps:
(a) The sender and the recipient generate B > 1 common inputs. (b) The
sender and the recipient calculate the output of their PM for the set of B
inputs and store the B sets of the corresponding values yki (i = 1, ..., B) of the
hidden units (the internal representations) (c) The transmission of mutual
information; the sender/recipient sends a package consisting of B bits (b
S/R
i )
to the recipient/sender. (d) The sender and the recipient are updating their
weights using the same learning rule as for B = 1: In case that bit bSi 6= b
R
i
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Figure 5: Total number of transmitted bits until synchronization. B is the
number of bits in each bit package exchanged between sender and recipient.
the learning process is taking place as before using the corresponding internal
representations. The synchronization time is dramatically reduced, as is
shown in Fig. 5. For instance, for N = 21, K = 3, L = 3, synchronization is
achieved after 12 bit packages if the size of the package is larger than B ≥ 32.
Other extensions of our method as well as the analytical calculation of
the distribution of tsync, tlearn for various K,L and continuous weights, and
version space of the PMs which are consistent with the training set will be
dicussed in [18].
Finally, we want to remark that synchronization is a subject of recent
research in neuroscience, where for instance, in experiments on cats and
monkeys one has found that the spike activity of neurons in the visual cortex
has correlations which depend on the kind of optical stimulus shown to the
animal [17]. The phenomenon described here suggests that synchronization
can be used by biological neuronal networks or by networks of the immune
system to exchange secure information between different parts of an organ-
ism.
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